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The variegated experiences of financialisation in Emerging Capitalist Economies (ECEs) 
require a theory of global structural transformation in which these appearances can be located.  
Such a transformation can be found in the substantive completion of the internationalisation of 
the circuits of capital, thereby marking the passage into a new stage of financialised capitalism.  
In this new stage, finance has taken the concrete form of a US dollar market-based system, 
while production is carried out through global production networks. The confluence of these 
new realities has impacted both the size and the nature of the transfer of value from subordinate 
regions. An increasing share of this transferred value is captured by finance, both as reward for 
services rendered and as opportunities for expropriation have proliferated.  In financialised 
capitalism, ECEs are cast in a subordinate position in relation to the extraction, realisation, and 
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As discussed in the opening chapter of the recently published handbook of financialisation 
(Mader et al., 2020), there is growing recognition of the importance of studying the 
phenomenon in emerging capitalist economies (ECEs). While the attention to country-specific 
detail which this has brought is welcome, what is needed is a theory of global structural 
transformation in which these variegated appearances can be situated.  This paper will outline 
a theory of the current stage of mature capitalism, that is, financialised capitalism, the 
inherently global and uneven nature of which provides insight into the shared experience of 
subordination of ECEs in the contemporary period while allowing for spatial variegation. 
As we have previously argued (Bonizzi et al., 2020) there is an important distinction to 
be made between financial phenomena which are cyclical and often speculative in nature, and 
a secular increase in the relative size and weight of finance. The former are spatially- and 
temporally-limited processes, and therefore can be subject to ‘de-financialisation’—a  
particular bubble can burst and/or be quelled by regulation; the latter marks the emergence of 
a new stage of mature capitalism, in which the expansion and transformation of finance is both 
underpinned by and crucial to the process of accumulation. Financialised capitalism, at a higher 
level of abstraction, has emerged following the substantive completion of the 
internationalisation of the three circuits of capital: money, commodity and productive. The 
passage of capital through its various forms now takes place at the global level, rather than 
within any single nation-state. Whereas the internationalisation had previously been limited to 
financing and commodity circulation, in the last three decades it has come to include the 
internationalisation of production itself, a process first theorised in the 1970s with the 
emergence of the multinational corporation (Palloix, 1975). This internationalisation of 
production has allowed a greater extraction and transfer of value from workers in ECEs to 
agents disproportionately located in advanced capitalist economies (ACEs). Importantly, an 
increasing share of this value is captured by financial capital, thanks to its supporting role and 
strategic position with respect to the internationalisation of capital.  
At a more concrete level, two key changes characterise financialised capitalism as a 
new stage. The first is the highly disaggregated nature of global production in the form of global 
production networks (Coe & Yeung, 2015). The transfer of value occurs through networks of 
production that are global and flexible, but are controlled by a relatively small number of large 
powerful firms, mainly located in ACEs. The second key change has been the transformation 
of finance into a globalised US dollar market-based system, as highlighted in the recent critical 
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macro-finance (CMF) literature (Dutta et al., 2020). These two transformations emerge from 
dynamics within productive and financial capital respectively, but are also deeply intertwined. 
Market-based finance plays a crucial role in the international extension, expansion and 
intensification of capitalist accumulation and its monetary realisation at the global level; at the 
same time, global production networks have intensified global movements of value, both legal 
and otherwise, which have enabled the unprecedented expansion of finance and its 
transformation to increasingly market-based forms.  
In the current paper, we set out to theorise the distinctive nature of financialised 
capitalism as experienced in ECEs. Our key argument is that ECEs’ subordinate1 position in 
the circuits of capital is both a constituent feature of and shapes the forms taken by financialised 
capitalism. Thus, where financialisation is used more generally to denote an increasing weight 
of finance, the systemic nature of financialised capitalism can be understood to denote (a) what 
role subordinate units play in this system and consequently (b) how this is experienced and in 
what forms it appears. The restructuring of production around global production networks and 
finance around a US dollar market-based system both require and sustain ECEs’ subordinate 
positions in global capitalism, but also reshape them and create new forms of subordination, 
apparent in both production and finance, and the sources of aggregate demand. This 
subordination brings with it both a structural value transfer from ECEs to the core and 
constraints on the agency of actors in ECEs. 
In the next section, we further elaborate our theory of (subordinate) financialised 
capitalism. In the third section, we discuss the key transformations of the financial sector in 
this period and ECEs’ subordinate position therein. This is followed by an examination of the 
mechanisms through which value is transferred from the site of its creation, with an eye to the 
key role of the internationalisation of the circuit of production and ECEs’ subordinate position 
in this circuit.  In the fifth section, we connect global production to market-based finance, 
drawing attention to the ways in which finance expropriates value from the internationalisation 
of capitalist accumulation, examining its relationship with the landscape of finance that we are 
currently witnessing, and highlighting how this is both shaped by and reinforces ECE’s 
subordinate position. The final section concludes. 
 
 
1 Subordinate financialisation—as opposed to subordinate financialised capitalism—can be analysed from any 
number of levels (intra-household, sub-national, etc.) or vectors of power (class, gender, race). However, where 
we want to distinguish financialised capitalism as a distinctive global stage, the dimension of the state, and the 
unequal relations among states, must be considered. 
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A THEORY OF FINANCIALISED CAPITALISM AND SUBORDINATION 
While this is not the place to enter into a long elaboration of how the concept of financialised 
capitalism sits within the large and growing literature which falls under the broad heading of 
financialisation (see Powell, 2019, for such a discussion), it is germane to the present discussion 
to situate financialised capitalism, which we will argue is necessarily super-/sub-ordinate in 
nature, within the growing literature on financialisation in ECEs. Seminal pieces surveying the 
literature on financialisation in ECEs include Bonizzi (2013), Karwowski and Stockhammer 
(2017), and Karwowski (2020). A large part of the existing literature on financialisation in 
ECEs focuses on the diversity of the financialisation experiences across different sectors, 
focusing on non-financial corporations (Demir, 2009; Powell, 2013; Sen & Dasgupta, 2018; 
Bowman, 2018), financial institutions (Painceira, 2010; Lee, 2012; Rethel, 2018; Petry, 2020), 
and households (Karacimen, 2015; Settle, 2016; Fernandez & Aalbers, 2020). However there 
is no consensus about the relative importance of subordination in the financialisation process. 
A part of the literature, influenced by regulationist, Marxist and structuralist theory, maintains 
that financialisation in ECEs is primarily characterised as a subordinate, or peripheral process, 
where the role of external actors is fundamental to the process of domestic financialisation (e.g. 
Becker et al., 2010; Powell, 2013; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018; Bonizzi et al., 2019). 
Karwowski and Stockhammer (2017), on the other hand, argue that financialisation trajectories 
should not be seen as externally-driven, but shaped by domestic institutions and internal 
dynamics. They document the variegated outcomes along a number of variables, including 
financial liberalisation and deregulation, foreign financial inflows, the shift from bank-based 
to market-based finance, levels of indebtedness, and household involvement in finance, 
showing the importance of domestic factors in shaping these dynamics. 
Any suggestion of a dichotomy between external pressure and internal dynamics should 
be rejected as reflecting a nation- rather than world-centric epistemology. The implicit 
understanding in much of the literature is one of discrete nation-state units interacting (with 
disagreement over the degree and direction of influence), rather than that of integrated parts of 
a totality co-evolving. Financialised capitalism should be understood as a global phenomenon, 
in which ECEs adopt a specific subordinate role which is both immanent to and shapes their 
experience and empirical appearances of that global process. The lived experiences of 
financialisation differ based on where one sits in an uneven hierarchy of classes and nation-
states. From the perspective of actors in ECEs, agency is neither absent nor absolute, but 
circumscribed by their position in global capitalism. 
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Important to our concept of subordinate financialised capitalism is our distinction 
between a cyclical process (‘financialisation’) and a secular stage (‘financialised capitalism’). 
While speculative gains may sustain themselves purely through the expansion of interest-
bearing and fictitious capital for a time, long-term expansion in the relative weight of finance 
must ultimately locate the source of the value thus appropriated. This raises the first significant 
contribution of our understanding of subordinate financialised capitalism, namely the central 
role given to an understanding of value creation and appropriation. Bernards (2019, p. 7) 
rightfully questions the failure of much of the financialisation literature to sufficiently 
interrogate the material basis for observed changes in financial behaviour.  Indeed, most of the 
literature fails to engage with the question of the source of the value which is captured by 
finance. For example, the Post Keynesian literature on currency hierarchy and subordinate 
financialisation emphasises the severe constraints on domestic agency as a result of financial 
integration, but fails to consider the persistent value transfer underpinning global capitalism 
(e.g. Ramos, 2017; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018).   
We argue that critical to the ‘sustainability’ of the financial turn in this latest stage of 
mature capitalism is the subordinate integration of the periphery into the world economy; the 
transfer of surplus value has been facilitated and amplified by the completion of the 
international circuit of productive capital. The latter has been accompanied by the emergent 
and uneven operation of the law of value on the world market, which has played a key role in 
the transformation and acceleration of the geographic transfer of value from the working 
classes of subordinated regions to the core, the subject of section four. The proliferation of 
circuits of capital across time and space has demanded a vastly increased role for market-based 
finance in the funding and governance of accumulation, while affording finance lucrative new 
opportunities for capturing a greater share of value created through a variety of methods.   
At a more concrete level, financialised capitalism is characterised by two changes 
involving the restructuring of production and finance at the global level. Firstly, production has 
restructured itself into disaggregated hierarchically-structured global production networks, 
with ECEs playing a subordinate role. Explicit consideration to the role of working classes in 
ECEs is given in the work of Milberg & Winkler (2013), Labour Process Theorists (Parker et 
al., 2018), and the Monthly Review school (Foster, 2015; Suwandi, 2019). Multinational firms 
headquartered in ACEs are understood to occupy a monopsonistic position in global production 
networks, from where they are able to exploit wage differentials and strategic control of assets. 
Within these networks, finance is increasingly understood as playing an essential supporting 
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role in controlling the financial mechanisms through which value is transferred and stored (Coe 
and Yeung, 2019; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017). 
Conceptually, however, these contributions have largely focused on the changing 
relations of non-financial actors with finance, rather than the structural changes in financial 
systems themselves. This is also true of more general conceptualisations of financialisation 
itself. Seminal studies (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; and Krippner, 2005) were mainly preoccupied 
with the changing relationship between finance and real accumulation. As Mader et al. (2020) 
describe it, financialisation is usually theorised as affecting the real economy at the macro-level 
(as a regime of accumulation), at the corporate governance level (shareholder value), or the 
micro level (‘everyday life’ financialisation). Although the ‘financial services revolution’ is 
mentioned by Aalbers (2019) as one of the key themes of financialisation, the literature is less 
detailed on the key changes in financial systems in the era of financialised capitalism2.  
Drawing on the emerging literature on Critical Macro Finance (CMF), we argue that a 
second key change marking the stage of financialised capitalism is the transformation of 
finance into a globalised US dollar market-based system. This system allows financialised 
capitalism a flexible and elastic supply of credit and hedging mechanisms, as well as 
mechanisms to govern production through its ability to move and store financial wealth 
offshore. It also exerts an attractive pull over different financial systems across countries, which 
become financially connected through it, and are transformed by it. The concurrent rise of 
global market-based finance thus represents the other side of the coin of financialised 
capitalism to global production, offering the instruments to support the restructuring of 
production and the transfer of value.  
As will be shown in this paper, in both finance and production, ECEs assume a 
subordinate position which is both inherent to the working of financialised capitalism and 
shapes the experience of ECE actors therein; whereas subordination in production creates the 
value, subordination in finance ensures its safe transfer to, realisation and storage as financial 
wealth, primarily (but not only) in ACEs and their offshore centres. This systemic view allows 
for a framing of different financialisation experiences, but does not in itself fully capture their 
specificity, and variegation across different ECEs persists.  
 
 
2 See Dutta et al. (2020) for a similar critique. There are some important exceptions which we will dicuss in the 
next section. 
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GLOBAL DOLLAR MARKET-BASED FINANCE 
In the literature on financialisation, there are two important exceptions to the lack of direct 
focus on the changes within the financial sector. First, there is work focusing on the 
transformation of banking (i.e. Erturk and Solari, 2007; Lapavitsas, 2013; and Caverzasi et al, 
2019), highlighting the shifting source of bank profits, from lending to firms, to fees and 
commissions, trading, and lending to households. Important to this change has been the 
engagement of banks with the ‘shadow banking’ sector, a network of financial institutions 
dedicated to the production and trading of securities. Second, there is a literature focusing on 
the rise of institutional investors: the growth of pension funds, insurance companies and asset 
managers, as new key agents, alongside banks, of modern financial markets. This has been 
argued to be partly the result of growing wealth inequalities whereby richer households 
accumulate wealth that needs managing through financial markets (Lysandrou, 2018), and 
partly the result of the changes in welfare policies, which have expanded the scope for 
privatised management of income security through pension and insurance companies (Engelen, 
2003). These agents are seen as central to the ‘assetisation’ process, i.e. the transformation of 
income streams into tradable financial assets, itself a process characterising financialisation 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016).  
Outside the explicit financialisation boundaries, Critical Macro-Finance (CMF) has 
located the key structural change in the financial sector in the turn to market-based finance, at 
the core of which stands the reconfiguration of money markets and the extent to which this 
mirrors US institutional structures and is embedded in US dollar funding markets (Gabor, 2016; 
2020). A particularly crucial development here has been the turn to market collateral as a way 
to back banking transactions and credit creation (Sissoko, 2019). Market-based banking, where 
assets and liabilities are mainly traded market instruments rather than deposits and loans, had 
become widespread by the 2000s (Hardie et al., 2013).  
Besides money markets, market-based finance is heavily reliant on derivatives, which 
are used to both finance positions and hedge the risks of market-based credit creation (Gabor, 
2020). Derivatives are subject to constant price fluctuations, thus requiring trading strategies 
that employ complex mathematical modelling, and are increasingly backed by collateral 
through central counterparty clearing (CCP) systems (Lindo, 2018; Spears, 2019). It is the 
constellation of financial institutions outside traditional commercial banks involved in 
derivative trading, as well as repo markets and securitisation, which constitutes the modern 
‘shadow banking’ system (Caverzasi et al., 2019; Braun and Gabor, 2020). Development of 
 9 
long-term securities markets is also crucial to the system, as the balance sheet of institutional 
investors grows, these securities are needed as collateral. In this process, the asset management 
industry has assumed an important position, as providers of an array of financial products for 
its worldwide clients, which include pension funds (Bonizzi and Kaltenbrunner, 2019) and 
high-net-worth individuals (Lysandrou, 2018).  
In time, market-based finance has become international, if—as will be discussed further 
below—in an uneven and hierarchical way. On the one hand, this can be seen in the export of 
the US model of market-based finance to other countries, based on the pressure of the financial 
sector, which remains largely concentrated among a few players in New York and London 
(Gowan, 2009; Fichtner, 2017; Gabor, 2018). On the other hand, it can be seen in the growing 
internationalisation and dominance of US dollar markets, whose offshore dimension represents 
a key characteristic of the international monetary system in the current stage (Murau et al., 
2020).  
CMF stresses how these transformations of finance were not just a spontaneous product 
of deregulation and liberalisation, but partly the outcome of explicit institutional and policy 
design. As Gabor (2020) argues, these key transformations can be traced back to Volcker’s turn 
to monetarism and financial innovation focused on developing liquid securities markets 
(Konings, 2009). The new financial system that emerged in the 1970s and was consolidated in 
the 1980s was favoured by private financial actors, but was crucially supported by public 
authorities, particularly central banks, which need it to exercise their policy-making powers 
(Braun et al., 2020; Wansleben, 2020).  
These transformations in global finance, while complex and uneven, must have a visible 
empirical manifestation. We provide a summary of the key characteristics of finance in the 




The first key characteristic is the institutionalisation of wealth, embodied by the growth of 
institutional investors. This has outpaced the growth of global GDP, and the total wealth 
invested in financial markets at the end of 2018 is close to $115 trillion, or 132% of GDP 
(Figure 1). This growth mirrors the expansion of long-term securities markets (Figure 2), which 
exceed $180 trillion in 2018, or 200% of GDP, up from 40% in 1980. In both cases the US 
accounts for about 40% of the total. The growth of securities markets is also a product of the 
collateralisation of transactions, which brings us to the second change. 
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<Figures 1 and 2> 
  
Figure 3 illustrates the transformation of banking.  Commercial banks in the US, Germany and 
Japan have dedicated a decreasing share of their portfolio to business loans, whereas other 
assets, such as household loans, securities or inter-bank lending have increased. Deposits are 
no longer the only funding source, as wholesale funding and other market liabilities increased 
(Hardie et al, 2013). Despite some reversal of these trends since the Great Recession, most 
notably the decline in wholesale funding, Figure 4 shows how the markets for repos and 
securitised assets, two key elements of market-based banking, are as large or larger than in 
2007, with the US still accounting for the lion’s share. 
 
<Figures 3 and 4> 
 
A third key feature has been the substantial innovation in the production of new traded financial 
instruments. This includes securitisation and the creation of new asset classes, which fill the 
balance sheets of global investors, by connecting new revenue streams to tradable assets. It also 
includes the expansion in market-based strategies to deal with risks. Two particular sources of 
risk, interest rate and exchange rate volatility, have led to a rapid growth in derivatives markets. 
Daily interest-rate and exchange-rate derivative transaction volumes have reached $4.6 and 




The fourth key characteristic has been the progressive internationalisation of finance. This has 
given rise to a dramatic increase in cross-border asset positions and capital flows: financial 
integration has proceeded steadily, reaching 250% of GDP in ACEs and 75% of GDP in ECEs, 
with the only noticeable dip coming during the 2008 financial crisis (Figure 6). This large 
growth of cross-border financial claims has resulted in an explosion of exchange-rate related 
transactions noted above. The importance of the US dollar in this internationalised, market-
based system is reflected in its share of foreign exchange-related transactions, exceeding 85% 







A final important characteristic is the tighter interconnection between financial markets and 
governance. Financial markets have become a key vehicle to conduct economic policy, making 
government institutions embedded deeply into private financial markets (and vice-versa). This 
is evident in the case of monetary policy, which is itself conducted through market-based 
transactions in repo markets, and increasingly seeks to influence the economy through its 
provision of liquidity in the hope of affecting the full range of asset prices. More broadly, states 
pursue a variety of objectives through market-based finance, from monetary integration as well 
as social and public policy (Lagna, 2016; Karwowski, 2019).  
In sum, these five interconnected characteristics represent different aspects of the 
restructuring of the global financial system around US dollar market-based finance. Although 
not as widespread and often only incipient, many ECEs have seen similar transformations to 
market-based systems over recent years. Our argument is that these transformations have been 
conditioned by the needs and imperatives of ACE financial, and indeed non-financial actors as 
discussed in section five, to generate high returns at the lowest risk possible and transfer and 
store them as financial wealth.  
The Post Keynesian literature on currency hierarchy has pointed to ECEs’ need to offer 
higher returns in the form of higher interest rates, and security, for example through the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, to compensate for the lower liquidity premium of 
these countries’ currencies (e.g. Herr and Hübner 2005; Prates and Andrade, 2013; 
Kaltenbrunner, 2015; Bonizzi, 2017; de Paula et al., 2017). However emphasis has been on the 
constraints financial integration creates for economic agency in ECEs rather than the persistent 
value transfer underpinning global capitalism which financial integration facilitates. In 
contrast, classical to post-colonial Marxist literature on imperialism (e.g. Luxemburg, 1913; 
Lenin, 1916; and Baran, 1952; Frank, 1967) has debated the nature of value transfer, while 
paying less attention to the role played by specific institutional arrangements of finance in that 
transfer.   
Whereas financial subordination has always been a constituent feature of capitalism 
(even pre-dating it), it has assumed new forms in the stage of financialised capitalism. Given 
the changes in core financial systems discussed above, the ‘security’ to realise returns is 
provided by ECEs adopting market-based systems and the institutional structures underpinning 
them. Whereas in bank-based systems direct relationships between lenders and borrowers 
supported the realisation of financial returns, in market-based systems the provision of 
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liquidity, that is the ability to sell an asset at any time and at little cost, becomes essential to 
investor security. As a result, the assets sought by foreign investors have become more varied 
and dominated by tradable instruments, such as different types of bond market securities, 
equities, exchange traded funds, and derivatives. Many ECEs are now included in 
internationally traded indices and exchange traded funds (Converse et al. 2020; Gabor, 2020). 
The domestic corollary has been the push to develop domestic bond and equity markets for 
government and firm financing and derivatives markets to hedge interest and exchange rate 
risk. On the production side, as will be discussed in more detail in section five, the increased 
marketization of ECE financial systems according to ACE blueprints has ensured the safe 
repatriation of profits and remittances, and facilitated the flexible internationalisation of 
production through a variety of modes.  
In addition to the shift of domestic institutional structures to market-based financing, 
risk to global financial capital has been reduced by the institution of similar macroeconomic 
regimes and governance standards. Inflation-targeting has maintained low inflation and thus 
higher real returns.  The widespread adoption of officially floating exchange rate regimes has 
made changes in the domestic currency a crucial element of returns;  to reduce the 
accompanying risks for global investors, interventions in the forex market (in the form of 
managed or ‘dirty’ floats) and massive reserve accumulation have become commonplace 
(Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2015).  Capital account deregulation and the removal of capital 
controls, in turn, have ensured that financial returns can be safely transferred abroad. 
Standardisation according to Anglo-American governance blueprints reduces risk for global 
investors, and embeds states and societies further in the system of ‘market rule’, thereby 
converting ECE assets into ‘investables’ (Soederberg, 2003; 2007). Ensuring legal and property 
rights is crucial to guarantee global financial actors that they can repatriate their investments 
and have their property rights secured. Familiar accounting, governance, and regulatory 
structures reduce uncertainty and information costs for core actors, further increasing the 
liquidity of their investments (Hebb and Wójcik, 2005) 
The role of ECEs in the stage of financialised capitalism is subordinate on two counts. 
First, the returns constitute a claim on future value creation, the realisation of which demands 
a transfer of value. Whereas traditionally these financial returns have been constituted by 
interest rates on foreign currency debt, as ECEs found themselves unable to borrow in domestic 
currencies, recent transformations to market-based systems have added trading gains and 
processes of asset market inflation to these returns. Moreover, as pointed out above, given the 
move to floating exchange rate regimes and increasing prevalence of domestic currency 
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denominated assets, exchange rate changes have become a crucial element of returns for 
international investors.  
Second, the provision of liquidity to (foreign) investors and adoption of ‘prudent’ 
macroeconomic policy and governance mechanisms of the core circumscribes agency in those 
countries. The threat of immediate exit, often unrelated to domestic economic conditions 
largely exogenises key economic prices and macroeconomic variables such as the exchange 
rate and interest rate. Moreover, ‘prudent’ macroeconomic policy and reserve accumulation 
have done little to protect ECEs from the global financial cycle (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 
2015), but come at a substantial cost: whereas macroeconomic discipline reduces financial 
resources available for development, reserve accumulation has been identified as another 
mechanism of global value transfer as ECEs’ high return liabilities are matched by low-yielding 
US Treasury bills (Painceira, 2008). Global governance standards, furthermore, might be 
unsuitable for the stage of development and financial structure of ECEs, while many of the key 
infrastructures, for example exchanges for ETFs, are located and governed in ACEs.  
As will be discussed in detail in section five, subordinate financialised capitalism is not 
only an issue for policy makers, but also circumscribes the daily financial practices of private 
economic actors, siphoning domestic profits abroad in the form of financial payments such as 
dividends, share buy-backs, and interest payments. Evidence shows that non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) in several ECEs have borrowed increasingly from financial markets rather 
than banks (BIS, 2020). However, this borrowing was either at substantially higher interest 
rates as those observed for core NFCs or, more frequently, denominated in foreign currency, 
which has made these companies very vulnerable to (expected) exchange rate changes. 
Moreover, a large part of this borrowing has taken place not domestically but on international 
financial markets, making those companies subject to international law and governance rules 
(Coppola et al., 2020). 
In sum, global financial markets have seen a structural shift to market-based financing 
centred around (offshore) US dollar funding markets which aid core financial actors to realise 
and transfer financial returns safely across the globe. We turn in the next section to the 
restructuring of global production and how this has impacted the geographic transfer of value, 
before going on in section five to look in more detail at the relationship between the two.  
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VALUE TRANSFER, THE INTERNATIONAL CIRCUIT OF PRODUCTIVE 
CAPITAL, AND FINANCE 
The last half century has been indelibly marked by a transformation in the nature of global 
production.  What began as a collection of cross-border initiatives by MNEs to source low-cost 
inputs abroad or find additional end markets, has evolved into diverse, often complex, multi-
layered GPNs, which slice production processes into constituent steps and relocate them 
geographically in an effort to exploit differences in labour costs and productivity (this is 
necessarily a simplification, as the length, geographical dispersion and governance of GPNs 
varies significantly by sector).  As a result, MNEs, overwhelmingly headquartered in ACEs, 
have become much more international with an increasing share of assets, sales and employment 
emanating from foreign operations (UNCTAD, 2020).  From a macroeconomic perspective, 
this meant not only rapidly rising global trade volumes (at least until the Great Recession 
starting in 2008-9 and now the global coronavirus pandemic), but an increase in the number of 
countries’ bilateral trade relations and a proliferation of sectors which have so diversified.   
In this section, we will examine the mechanisms of the transfer of value from the 
working classes of the periphery to the capitalists of the core, and how the size and nature of 
that transfer has been shaped by the transformation in the nature of global production, namely 
by the effective completion of the internationalisation of the circuit of productive 
capital. Following Ricci’s (2019) framework, we can distinguish inter- and intra-industry 
transfer of surplus value from its site of creation to a distinct site of realisation.  Interindustry 
transfers, a differential rent, emerge out of differences between industries which dominate in 
the core versus those prominent in the periphery; these differences can be in wages, profit rates 
and capital intensity.  Intraindustry transfers, an absolute rent, reflect differences between firms 
in the core and those in the periphery in the same industry, either in wages adjusted for labour 
productivity or profit rates owing to the growth of monopoly.  
The first model of inter-industry transfer is that of Lewis (1954), wherein competitive 
pressures from workers in the traditional sector keep wages in the modern sector below their 
productivity level.  Given pressures towards the equalisation of profit rates, productivity 
growth in the periphery results in lower export prices to the benefit of core consumers.  The 
result is declining terms-of-trade for ECEs, and a value transfer to ACEs.  Persistence in the 
core-periphery gap in unit labour costs suggests that where labour productivity in the periphery 
is rising, nominal wages are being restrained (through manipulation of the reserve army of 
labour, anti-union activities, etc.).  Suwandi (2019, p. 48) shows that the gap in unit labour 
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costs between core countries (US, UK, Germany and Japan) and emerging capitalist economies 
(China, India, Indonesia and Mexico) has “been in the order of 40-60% during most of the last 
three decades.” 
Perhaps the best known work on unequal exchange is that of Prebisch (1950) and Singer 
(1950) which linked declining terms of trade not to wage differentials, but to the tendency for 
ECEs to specialise in primary exports while ACEs export industrial goods.  Due to lower 
income and price elasticity of demand for primary products, and assisted by monopolistic 
competition in the markets for industrial goods, ACE firms are able to capture greater benefits 
from trade.  Criticism of this argument has been made that it does not reflect the exploitation 
of one nation by another, but the exploitation of labour and the transference (not creation) of 
value in the competition between different bourgeoisies.  Nonetheless, “… the bigger the 
transfers of surplus value to the country with a superior organic composition of its global 
national capital, the bigger this force is against the fall of the rate of profit in the country.” 
(Miranda, 2019, p. 676)  While inroads into manufacturing sectors have been made by ECE 
firms in the period of globalisation, some two-thirds of the profits of the top 2000 TNCs accrue 
to firms headquartered in ACEs (UNCTAD, 2018, p. 58), dominating what are today’s highest 
profit industries such as pharmaceuticals, media and ICT (UNCTAD, 2017, p. 126).  Firms in 
these industries enjoy barriers to entry from economies of scale, network effects, technological 
advantage, and institutional or regulatory factors.  UNCTAD research covering ICT, chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals revealed that increasing patent protection was associated with increased 
sales per worker of US MNE affiliates, but not for local companies (UNCTAD, 2017, p. 134). 
From a distinctively Marxian perspective comes the related argument that surplus value 
transfer may arise out of inter-industry differences in capital intensity.  Grossman (1992, p. 170 
[1929]) showed how a higher organic composition in the advanced countries means that a 
higher rate of surplus value may co-exist with a lower profit rate.  The tendency for the 
equalisation of profit rates suggests that the advanced country commodities will sell above their 
price of production while the emerging country commodities will sell below it.  Additional 
surplus value is captured by the advanced country capitalist through the exchange of non-
equivalents.  Importantly, Grossman, as per Marx (1867, ch.22), is assuming that the advanced 
country producers are not compelled by competition to lower their selling price to the price of 
production.  Ricci (2019, p. 8) argues that “the factor preventing market prices of individual 
national commodities to equalize in the world market is the product differentiation between 
national varieties of the same commodity”, supported by enormous global expenditures in 
marketing, and various tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.   
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The analysis thus far, suggesting a world where commodities from the core confront 
those of the periphery in the world market, gives only a partial understanding of contemporary 
value transfer.  An increasing share of global trade is transacted by and within the production 
networks, affiliates and even between units of TNCs, allowing them to exploit not only inter-
industry differentials, but intra-industry ones as well.  TNC supply chains make up 80% of 
world trade, while intra-industry trade accounts for 44% (Brülhart, 2009).  Intra-firm TNC 
trade is estimated at around one-third of global trade (Lanz and Miroudot, 2011).  Evidence 
suggests that flows with foreign affiliates are increasingly important part of parent TNCs’ 
revenue; they accounted for approximately 17% of US TNCs’ worldwide net income in 1977, 
27% in 1994 and 48.6% by 2006 (Slaughter, 2009, p. 16 in Selwyn, 2018, p. 10). 
The importance of wage differentials to intra-industry transfer of surplus value was first 
advanced by Emmanuel (1972), who argued that the transfer was rooted in institutional factors 
such as trade union density.  With the expansion of global labour-value production networks, 
a number of arguments have been put forward to explain why wages in the periphery do not 
grow in line with productivity gains. Smith (2016) deploys the concept of super-exploitation 
to describe the circumstances where workers are remunerated below their social reproduction 
costs.  Financialisation, he contends, is “to a significant extent a materialization of surplus 
value extracted from super-exploited workers in low wage countries.” (2016, p. 299)  Bowman 
(2018) documents how shareholder pressures favoured downward wage pressure over 
productivity investments in the South African mining industry.  Selwyn (2018) cites case 
studies of both Cambodian garment workers whose wages are insufficient to avert malnutrition 
and electronics workers in China where vast amounts of overtime work are required to meet 
individual reproduction needs.  This highlights the gendered basis of surplus value transfers, 
both through women’s direct exploitation (Mezzadri, 2017) and the indirect exploitation of 
women’s role in social reproduction activities which determine socially necessary labour time.  
Another line of argument emphasises the importance of the ability to hold down wages 
in the periphery in the face of productivity levels which are approaching those of the core.  As 
Chesnais puts it, the “trend towards global homogenisation of productivity levels through the 
diffusion of equipment, technology and on-site management methods, while the socio-political 
context is that of strong or very strong national differences in necessary labour time.” (2016, 
p. 166)  Kerswell (2013), echoing Emmanuel’s arguments regarding the importance of 
institutional factors in determining wages, provides evidence of sectors where periphery 
productivity outstrips that of levels in the core: Mexico and India, for example, have higher 
productivity rates than the US and Germany in autos, while Brazil, Thailand and Mexico have 
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higher productivity rates than the US and Germany in textiles. Grinberg (2016, p. 270) 
documents how lower-value-adding activities are taken over by capitals located in lower wage 
locations in the semi-conductor industry, thereby increasing “the mass of surplus-value 
available for its process of valorization on a global scale.” This has not been accomplished 
through increasing intensification of the division of labour, but due to the increasing 
automation of manufacturing equipment.  The share of capital income in manufacturing GVCs 
increased by 3% between 2000 and 2014, while the income share of workers in the ‘fabrication 
stages’ declined by 3.7% in HICs and 1.3% in G20 countries (except China) (UNCTAD, 2018, 
p. 51–2). 
Complementing the arguments which emphasise wage differentials are those which put 
stress on profit differentials, often drawing upon the initial work on monopoly capitalism of 
Baran and Sweezy (1968).  Evidence abounds of the growing concentration of contemporary 
global capital accumulation: The top 1% of exporting firms, for example, accounted for 57% 
of country exports in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2018, p. 53).  As documented in a growing body of 
labour process theory literature, global labour-value production networks allow lead firms to 
secure strategic assets including “technology, human resources, forms of production 
organisation, intellectual property, and marketing and design” (Parker et al., 2018, p. 
52).  Capture of these often intangible assets allows the formation of barriers to entry and the 
extraction of technological and financial rents (Aguiar de Medeiros and Trebat, 2017, p. 401). 
Lead global firms profit from management fees charged for the trading of intangible services 
(Serfati, 2011), and the use of branding, design, and marketing (Froud et al., 2012; Soener, 
2015).  At the global level, charges for the use of foreign IPR rose from less than $50 billion 
in 1995 to $367 billion in 2015; a growing share of these charges represent “payments between 
affiliates of the same group often merely intended to shift profit to low-tax jurisdictions” 
(UNCTAD, 2018, p. 55). 
Within the production process proper, Milberg & Winkler (2013) have argued that lead 
firms enjoy monopsony power vis-à-vis their suppliers, allowing them to push down on costs 
in order to maintain high mark-ups.  Rather than re-investing these gains, econometric evidence 
suggests that there is a tendency to pay higher dividends, buyback shares and pursue mergers 
and acquisitions. Suwandi (2019) describes the process by which lead firms in labour-value 
chains exert control over their suppliers as ‘systemic rationalization’.  This might involve such 
measures as: requiring suppliers to reveal their cost structure, the application of international 
price benchmarks, direct control of overheads (and therefore profit margins), pressure on 
delivery times (JIT) and flexibility in product changes (which may force suppliers to engage in 
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outsourcing – numerical flexibility – themselves), forcing supply chain firms to hold buffer 
stock which allows the core firm to avoid such a necessity, forcing costs of compliance with 
international certification onto suppliers. These arguments provide support to the Starosta 
(2010) thesis regarding the ability of lead firms to capture surplus value created by small 
capitals which do not take part in the equalisation of the rate of profit at the general level. Lead 
firms have been able to leverage their position in global labour-value production networks for 
increased total profits and higher profit rates.  Ten percent of the world’s publicly listed 
companies account for 80% of total profits (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015).  The profit-to-
revenue ratio of the world’s biggest 2000 companies rose from 5.7% in the mid 90s to 7% in 
recent years (UNCTAD, 2018, p. 56). In turn, those countries that host apex firms are able to 
capture a greater share of overall value added (Aguiar de Medeiros and Trebat, 2017, p. 406). 
In response to this discussion of the mechanisms of the geographical transfer of value 
(GTV) one might reasonably ask what is new?  The history of GTV is a long one indeed, 
certainly pre-dating capitalism.  Within the capitalist mode of production, Braun (1977, cited 
in Cope, 2019, p. 21) distinguishes forms of GTV specific to the periods of colonialism (16th 
to 19th centuries), commercial expansion (19th century), capital export (20th century to the 
world wars) and unequal exchange (post-war but accelerating from the 1980s).  We raise this 
not to enter into a debate over periodisation, but to posit that the completion of the 
internationalisation of the circuit of productive capital has both quantitatively and qualitatively 
transformed the GTV.   Ricci’s (2019) empirical work suggests a doubling of the GTV between 
1995 and 2007; a period during which intraindustry transfers increased from less than half to 
two-thirds of the total transfer.  This highlights the growing importance of GPNs in channelling 
surplus value from its site of creation in the global periphery to its realisation predominantly in 
the core. Importantly for the larger argument of the paper, this has demanded of and afforded 
to finance a qualitatively different place within the circuits of capitalist accumulation, the 
changing appearances of which were described in section three.  In the next section, we will 
look more closely at the underlying connection between global finance and production, and 
ECEs’ subordinate position therein, to better understand how finance supports the operations 
of the transfer of value, and is itself rewarded for the same.   
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US DOLLAR MARKET-BASED FINANCE AND GLOBAL PRODUCTION 
NETWORKS 
So far we have discussed the restructuring of finance and production in parallel. However, as 
argued in section two, these two are immanently intertwined, shaping and reinforcing each 
other. In this section, we look first at the involvement of finance in the hierarchical process of 
global production and value creation, its realisation as profits, and its transfer and ‘storage’ as 
financial wealth; subsequently, we outline how this connection between GPNs and globalised 
US dollar market-based finance shapes and reinforces ECEs’ subordinate position in 
production and finance.  
First, with regards to value creation/extraction, globalised US dollar market-based 
finance has been necessary to establish and support GPNs. In the most direct way, GPNs 
require substantial financing to be established and maintained. Capital markets and financial 
intermediaries are required to mediate FDI, the vast majority of which is mergers and 
acquisitions (Andrenelli et al., 2019). Evidence for Austrian firms shows that whereas still 
largely bank-based, large internationalisation moves are often financed through IPOs or an 
increase in equity capital to avoid a deterioration of financial/debt ratios (Castillo et al., 2019). 
With regards to the maintenance of GPNs, as production is spread across countries and regions 
and the time and/or distance between production and payment is lengthened, firms in networks 
build up claims on each other and have greater working capital needs. Recent estimates suggest 
that, while the working capital in the domestic component of supply chains mostly takes the 
form of trade credit, i.e. trade payables and receivables between firms, 80% of the international 
component of deferred payments is mediated by the financial sector (Boissay et al., 2020). This 
trade finance mostly takes the form of bank intermediation and insurance, contributing to the 
rise of global megabanks which can offer services across the globe and manage the risk in-
house.  
US dollar funding markets dominate these relationships and benefit a system of global 
production organised by large lead firms predominantly located in ACEs. As Gopinath (2015) 
shows, global production has given rise to an international price system for most commodities, 
which is reflected in the dominance of the US dollar in trade invoicing and subsequently 
funding. The dominance of one global currency reduces the transaction costs and exchange rate 
risk for US capital and those fractions of global capital with easy access to dollar funding 
markets (Feygin and Leusder, 2020). Additionally the functional flexibility of a market-based 
financial system supports the internationalisation of production: the world economy, while 
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relying on US dollars, does not need to rely directly on US banks at all times to access them. 
Indeed, while US banks have contained their borrowing and lending since the global financial 
crisis, dollar money and securities markets continued to be crucial in providing, among other 
things, the funding for GPNs; either indirectly as foreign financial institutions access US 
dollars to fund the activity of global firms (BIS, 2020); or directly as global corporations 
finance themselves in US markets. Despite the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper 
frenzy post-2008, issuances of commercial paper by non-financial corporations, including non-
US ones, increased during the past decade, as did corporate bond issuance (BIS, 2020).  
The production of new financial instruments is also important to the evolving GPN risk 
mitigation strategies. The new risks associated with international production, chiefly those 
emerging from foreign exchange and interest rate volatility, can also be hedged through 
derivative markets. The explosion of foreign exchange swaps in the last decade, for example, 
has been a key way to access US dollars by foreign financial institutions, as they act effectively 
as short-term dollar loans secured against foreign currency collateral (Borio et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, by connecting GPNs to owners in ACEs through financial mechanisms, the 
imperative of (short-term) financial profitability is maintained. Lead firms can exploit their 
favourable financial positions to leverage their power over their suppliers. Baud and Durand 
(2012) argue that the increased importance of working capital and financing within GPNs 
enhances the power of downstream core firms with better access to finance, and who can exert 
their power over suppliers by delaying payment. Furthermore, shareholder pressures reinforce 
globalised production to ensure higher and more geographically diversified revenue streams 
(Palpacuer et al., 2006; Coe and Yeung, 2015). This is particularly so where financial markets 
impose themselves in productive networks directly, by reshaping commodities as standardised 
tradable financial securities (Palpacuer, 2008; Newman, 2009; Purcell, 2018). The impersonal 
force of market-based financial mechanisms compresses time and standardises return and profit 
expectations (and their distributions to asset owners) in a way that greatly enhances the 
disciplining role of finance. 
Second, globalised US dollar market-based finance is fundamental for the realisation 
of profits of financialised capitalism. The restructuring of global production and its 
interconnection with global market-based finance allows for the extraction of an increased 
surplus from the working classes of ECEs. However, the very nature of global production 
makes it impossible for surplus value (in the form of profits) to be realised in the location of 
its creation in its entirety because, as described in the previous section, the share of value 
captured by residents in ECEs (and workers especially) is small. In ACEs, some of the 
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traditional sources of demand have been weakened: public investment has declined across 
OECD countries, and the mass production/mass consumption Fordist model has been itself 
undermined by the globalisation of production and the weakening of trade unions, and the 
consequent rise of inequalities (Sweezy and Magdoff, 1987). Therefore, before value reaches 
its ‘end-point’ as accumulated financial wealth, financialised capitalism, like all stages of 
capitalism needs to confront its own systemic realisation problem. 
Global market-based finance has addressed this realisation problem by significantly 
enhancing the elasticity of the financial system to sustain aggregate demand in excess of current 
income. This takes the form of substantial accumulation and accommodation of debt, validated 
by growing asset prices. This debt, both private and public, has grown in waves interrupted 
only temporarily by financial crises, increasing from about 100% of global GDP in 1970 to 
230% in 2018 (Kose et al., 2020). Market-based banking allows for increasing elasticity in 
(especially US dollar) credit creation, compared to a system where banks only extend long-
term loans which they keep on their balance sheet, and fund with deposits. The collateralisation 
of lending shifts power to creditors from debtors, and the securitisation of credit offloads the 
risk to external investors (Sissoko, 2019), thus allowing banks to generate credit more easily. 
The parallel secular rise of financial asset prices, so-called “capital market inflation” 
(Toporowski, 2000),  has seen bond yields declining dramatically from their peak in the early 
1980s, and dividend yields similarly declining, if less dramatically (Figure 7). This has allowed 
firms, government, and issuers of securitised assets, to issue debt and equity securities cheaply. 
In other words, the secular accumulation of debt, has gone hand in hand with rising asset values, 
and as such, cheaper financing costs. This system is sustained by demand for securities, as the 
institutionalisation of wealth generates pools of investors in constant need of assets to fill their 
balance sheets. Finally, the role of public institutions underpins the whole system, in particular 
the central banks that are always ready to put a liquidity floor under financial markets, asset 
prices (cf. the Greenspan put), and thus aggregate demand (Dafermos et al., 2020). A 
paradoxical form of privatised Keynesianism is a necessary component of debt accumulation 




Therefore global realisation of profits relies on debt accumulation, validated by asset 
price inflation and liquidity support from central banks. Indeed, evidence shows how debt-
driven growth has been a phenomenon characterising many countries (Stockhammer and 
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Wildauer, 2016). Its epicentre is the US, as both the largest consumer market, hence at the end 
of many value chains, and the major node of global finance. The alternative is to rely indirectly 
on this debt accumulation, by relying on exports. Thus in financialised capitalism, debt-driven 
and export-oriented growth appear as the only viable regimes for sustained capital 
accumulation (Stockhammer, 2012; 2016).   
Finally, with regards to the transfer of value and its accumulation as financial wealth, 
as argued above, the increasingly market-based nature of financial systems in ECEs and the 
focus on capital account liberalisation, international governance standards, and macroeconomic 
discipline have bolstered the realisation and transfer of value to global financial centres. 
Parallel to GPNs, global wealth chains have been established, which govern the transfer of 
value downstream (Coe et al., 2014; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017; Quentin and Campling, 
2018). These take different forms and do not simply follow the structure of the productive 
networks, but extract value from them at various points, to channel profits to where they can 
be ‘stored’ as financial wealth minimizing taxation. Offshore financial centres play an 
important role in this, especially as the nominal location of intangible assets (Haberly and 
Wójcik, 2015; Bryan et al., 2017). The production of new securities allows for ‘storage’ of 
wealth by the owners of capital, who need stores of value as their profits accumulate 
(Lysandrou, 2018). Asset price movements also allow for the possibility of increasing profit 
opportunities within financial markets themselves by lead firms, in the form of merger and 
acquisition activities (Milberg, 2008; Baud and Durand, 2012). The financial sector is itself 
able to capture a larger share of value through fees and other charges that it receives in exchange 
for its role in these wealth chains.  
For ECEs, the connection between GPNs and globalised US dollar market-based 
finance is both shaped by and reinforces their existing subordinate position in production and 
finance. At the point of value extraction, as ECEs become embedded into GPNs, they 
simultaneously become exposed to the dollar-based financing system behind them. Foreign 
currency financing – increasingly on international financial markets and in market-based forms 
as discussed in section 3 - becomes, in this way, a necessary feature of participating in 
financialised capitalism. As a result, the operations of ECE firms and the dynamics of 
production become even more constrained by the liquidity cycles that characterise global 
financial markets. Moreover, as highlighted above, access to dollar funding markets and having 
a convertible currency becomes a key lever of international power and positioning within and 
between GPNs. 
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At this level particular balance sheet asymmetries and vulnerabilities can emerge in 
ECEs. Assemblers and suppliers in ECEs depend on foreign (US dollar) payments from retail 
firms in ACEs, to pay their own suppliers, creating a vulnerability of domestic activity and 
employment on the smooth working of external financial systems. Large non-financial 
corporations in ECEs access US dollar funding through money and capital markets, and in turn 
extend trade credit and finance to companies and customers in domestic currency (Hardy and 
Saffie, 2019). This type of mechanism, while representing a profitable form of ‘speculative’ 
activity, exposes ECEs to global liquidity shocks. When global liquidity contracts, and foreign 
financing becomes scarce, ECEs can be forced not only to cut back on their investment but also 
their extension of trade credit to domestic suppliers.  
Crucially, the configuration of global realisation given by the GPN-global finance 
nexus, significantly constrains the development options of ECEs. Increased dependency on 
cost competitive exports and capital-intensive extractive industries limits wage-powered 
consumer demand. In some countries this generates various forms of export-oriented regimes, 
some more successful such as the East Asian “exportists” models (Jessop and Sum, 2006), 
others less successful and fragile (Levy-Orlik, 2014; Stockhammer, 2016; Guevara et al., 
2018). Domestic forms of debt-led growth are also possible, although this is constrained by 
limited wealth and incomes, especially where this is highly unequally distributed.  
The policy space within such subordinate growth regimes is limited. As financing and 
trade are US-dollar denominated in GPNs, a domestic currency depreciation does not have 
expansionary effects on exports, but simply makes imports more expensive (Bruno and Shin, 
2019). Exports therefore mainly depend on global demand, channelled through GPNs, and 
global liquidity, channelled to global market-based finance, but exchange rate stability remains 
paramount as it allows access to necessary goods and foreign currency debt servicing. 
Monetary policy is therefore severely constrained by the volatility of financial flows 
responding to global liquidity conditions, forcing ECEs’ central banks to react to central bank 
decisions in the core to keep some degree of exchange rate stability (Rey, 2013; Kaltenbrunner 
and Painceira, 2017; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018). In sum, the business cycle in ECEs 
is dependent on the global financial cycle, over which ECEs have little control (Aldasoro et al., 
2020). 
Finally, with regards to the transfer and storage of financial wealth, we have seen that 
profits are either transferred into core/offshore financial centres or re-channelled into high 
yielding, but short-term and volatile financial assets in ECEs.  ECEs are in competition with 
each other, and are disciplined by both lead firms directly, and through financial institutions 
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which set global portfolio investment standards and facilitate foreign direct investment. The 
ostensibly low value-added of ECEs within GPNs (according to orthodox calculation) reflects 
both this competition and the high capital mobility allowed by global finance. The institution 
of market-based finance in ECEs, whilst further deepening the constraints on domestic 
economic policy making, has been crucial to secure the transformation of the profits generated 
in ECEs into financial wealth and – in most cases – transfer it into core financial centres. The 
possibility to retain value created through taxes too is limited, by the complex arrangements 
set up by global financial services to minimise tax costs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Increasing attention in the financialisation literature to diverse manifestations of the 
phenomenon in ECEs requires us to theorise the global structural transformation in which these 
variegated appearances can be situated.  We have argued that such a transformation can be 
found in the substantive completion of the internationalisation of the circuits of capital within 
the last half century.  The internationalisation of money capital, which in the contemporary 
period has taken the form of US dollar market-based finance, is characterised by the 
institutionalisation of wealth, the transformation of banking, the proliferation of new financial 
instruments and an increased governance role for finance. The completion of the 
internationalisation of productive capital, taking the form of GPNs, has both quantitatively and 
qualitatively altered the geographic transfer of value from subordinate regions and actors to 
superordinate ones, increasing the size of the transfer and placing greater emphasis on 
intraindustry channels.  These systems have co-evolved, reinforcing the subordinate role of 
ECEs in the extraction, realisation, and transfer of value, and constraining the agency of both 
public and private actors from subordinate regions, and ultimately undermining the possibility 
of more autonomous and broad-based development strategies. 
Theorising the phenomenon in this way has important implications for policy in a world 
where even orthodox analyses increasingly view the unchecked growth of finance with 
suspicion (Sahay et al., 2015).  Understanding financialisation as cyclical process resulting 
from national, or even international, policy failures suggests that we devote our energies 
towards regulation of the financial sector itself, adopting rules which may be ill-suited to the 
realities of ECEs.  While possibly necessary, these policies are certainly not sufficient.  The 
history of such efforts offers little hope for either an effective or lasting solution.  However, if 
our focus is on financialised capitalism, and its inherently super-/sub-ordinate dynamics, it 
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foregrounds very different priorities.  Instead it suggests the need to address workers’ struggles 
over wages and working conditions in the periphery, inequalities in income and wealth in both 
ACEs and ECEs, and the expansion of the public over social reproduction. 
 Finally, it might be suggested that the Covid-19 global pandemic spells the end of GPNs 
and/or the current configuration of global finance, and therefore fatally undermines our 
arguments over the foundations of financialised capitalism.  Undeniably, the coming years will 
see changes in technology and industrial organisation, but as argued by UNCTAD (2020), these 
changes variously push and pull towards differing trajectories of reshoring, diversification, 
regionalization and replication. And, while financial markets were heavily stressed in March 
2020, the scale and speed of liquidity provision globally makes it clear that US dollar market-
based finance is likely to stay as the fundamental infrastructure of global finance. Some future 
trajectories may even see a strengthening of the size and influence of global finance and its role 
in the subordination of ECEs.  Perhaps the greatest challenge to the ‘sustainability’ of this stage 
of financialised capitalism will instead come from a greater unfolding crisis, that of climate 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on FED Financial Accounts of the United States, Eurostat 
sectoral balance sheet accounts, Bank of Japan Flow of Funds Accounts, ONS UK Economic 
Accounts, and Sovereign Wealth Research at IE Center for the Governance of Change3 (2020). 
Data in millions of US dollars, converted through BIS exchange rate statistics if originally in 
different currency. Other FI comprise all non-bank financial institutions except ICPF. 
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From top left: United States, Japan and Germany.  
Source: Calculations based on Federal Reserve System H8 account, Bank of Japan Flow of 











































































































































































Source: ICMA (2020), FED Flow of funds of the United States, ChinaBonds, Sifma statistics 
on ABS and MBS, and Bank of Japan flow of funds accounts. Figures are in USD billion, and 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018). Left graph shows 













































































































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on Shiller (2015), data available from 
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